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The Transitivity and Asymmetry of Actual Causation
Abstract
The counterfactual tradition to defining actual
causation has come a long way since Lewis
started it off. However there are still important
open problems that need to be solved. One of
them is the (in)transitivity of causation. Endors-
ing transitivity was a major source of trouble for
the approach taken by Lewis, which is why cur-
rently most approaches reject it. But transitiv-
ity has never lost its appeal, and there is a large
literature devoted to understanding why this is
so. Starting from a survey of this work, we will
develop a formal analysis of transitivity and the
problems it poses for causation. This analysis
provides us with a sufficient condition for causa-
tion to be transitive, a sufficient condition for de-
pendence to be necessary for causation, and sev-
eral characterisations of the transitivity of depen-
dence. Finally, we show how this analysis leads
naturally to several conditions a definition of cau-
sation should satisfy, and use those to suggest a
new definition of causation.
1 Introduction
Causal modelling has become ubiquitous in Artificial Intel-
ligence circles, and is gaining popularity in other fields as
well. An unsolved problem in this context is how to define
actual causation, i.e., when should we say that one event
caused another? Ever since Lewis (1973) first analyzed this
problem in terms of counterfactual dependence forty years
ago, philosophers and researchers from the Artifical Intel-
ligence community alike have been trying to improve on
his attempt at cracking this causal nut. The seminal work
of Halpern and Pearl (2005) has led to the structural equa-
tions framework becoming the most important language to
deal with this problem.
The currently most prominent approaches to defining ac-
tual causation are those within the counterfactual depen-
dence tradition, which started with Lewis (1973). All of
these approaches take as their starting point the assump-
tion that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causa-
tion, but not necessary (Hitchcock, 2001; Woodward, 2003;
Hall, 2004, 2007; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2016;
Weslake, 2015). That dependence is sufficient is usually
accepted simply as a fundamental principle underlying cau-
sation. That it is not necessary, on the other hand, is usu-
ally defended by pointing to intuitively strong counterex-
amples. Lewis (1973) forms an important exception to this
rule, as he defends the lack of necessity by invoking a prin-
ciple as well, namely that causation is transitive: causation
is transitive, dependence is not, therefore there can be cau-
sation without dependence.
The first strategy, that of offering counterexamples, has
proven most successful. There are two reasons for this.
First, almost everyone besides Lewis rejects the transitiv-
ity of causation. Second, there are counterexamples to the
necessity of dependence that have nothing to do with tran-
sitivity. Despite its success, this strategy has to date not of-
fered a general insight into precisely when or why the tran-
sitivity of causation breaks down. Although a substantial
number of authors have addressed the problem of transitiv-
ity, none of them offers a generally sufficient condition for
causation to be transitive (McDermott, 1995; Hall, 2000,
2004; Hitchcock, 2001; Sartorio, 2005; Halpern and Pearl,
2005; Halpern, 2015; Paul and Hall, 2013). A recent dis-
cussion by Halpern (2015) does formulate several sufficient
and necessary conditions for transitivity, however those ap-
ply only to cases where there is dependence.
The main contribution of this paper is to offer a principled
explanation of why transitivity should be rejected as a gen-
eral condition, while also offering conditions under which
it should be satisfied. Specifically, we will explain both
why the transitivity of causation has a strong appeal, and
why there are nevertheless convincing counterexamples to
accepting it. We do so by an appeal to the principle that
causation is asymmetrical: an event is a cause only if its
absence would not have been a cause.1 Accepting this prin-
1Note that usually the asymmetry of a relation R(x, y) is in-
ciple leads the way to an analysis of causation as a tran-
sitive relation compromised by asymmetry. This analysis
provides us with a sufficient condition for causation to be
transitive, a sufficient condition for dependence to be nec-
essary, and several sufficient and necessary conditions for
dependence to be transitive. Finally, we use this analysis to
suggest a new definition of causation. The starting point for
our analysis consists of a detailed overview of the literature
on this topic.
Our story will be incomplete: we ignore one important type
of example, Late Preemption, that highlights the temporal
aspects of causation. This caveat will not undermine the
current discussion, because it stands orthogonal to the is-
sue of transitivity. In fact one can integrate this temporal
aspect into our analysis to give a more refined definition of
causation, which is what we aim to do in future work.
The next section introduces the structural equations frame-
work. Sections 3 offers the relevant background, and
presents a survey of the literature on transitivity. This leads
us to suggest a first condition any definition of causation
should satisfy, in Section 4. Section 5 introduces the con-
cept of contributing, which leads the way to a sufficient
condition for the transitivity of causation. We discuss the
asymmetry of causation in Section 6 and show how it can
be combined with transitivity to form an elegant explana-
tion of all aspects here discussed.
2 Structural Equations Modelling
We briefly introduce a simple version of structural equa-
tions modelling, which is the most popular formal language
used to represent causal models. In general, structural
equations allow functional dependencies between continu-
ous variables, or discrete variables with possibly an infinite
domain. However, the actual causation literature typically
considers only examples made up of discrete variables with
a finite domain, and propositional formulas. Further, in the
majority of cases the variables are Boolean. This is why
we restrict attention to those kinds of models. For a de-
tailed introduction, see (Pearl, 2000).
A structural model consists of a set of endogenous variables
~V , a set of exogenous variables ~U , and a causal model M .
Although we only consider models with Boolean variables,
we should point out that the results we will present can
easily be generalized to allow for multi-valued variables as
well. We explain this below.
A model M is a set of structural equations so that there is
exactly one equation for each variable Vi ∈ ~V . An equa-
tion takes the form Vi := φ, where φ is a propositional
formula over ~V ∪ ~U . For any variable Vi, we denote by φVi
the formula in the equation for Vi inM . We follow the cus-
terpreted as the following condition: R(x, y) ⇒ ¬R(y, x). Here
we take it to mean the following instead: R(x, y)⇒ ¬R(¬x, y).
tomary practice of leaving the equations for variables that
depend directly on the exogenous variables implicit, and
simply state the value they take in each particular story.
For an assignment (~v, ~u) of values to the variables in ~V ∪~U ,
we denote by φ(~v,~u) the truth value obtained by filling in
the truth values (~v, ~u) in the formula φ. An assignment
(~v, ~u) respects M , if for each endogenous variable Vi, its
value vi = φ
(~v,~u)
Vi
. As usual, we only consider models M
in which the equations are acyclic, which implies that for
each assignment ~u to ~U , there is exactly one assignment
(~v, ~u) that respects M . Therefore, we refer to ~U = ~u as a
context. For every value ~u of ~U , we call the pair (M,~u) a
causal setting. We write (M,~u) |= φ if φ(~v,~u) = true for
the unique assignment (~v, ~u) that respects M .
A literalL is a formula of the form Vi = vi orUi = ui. Our
restriction to Boolean variables is made concrete here: the
only values vi we consider are true and false. Hence our
definitions and results can be generalised by simply lifting
this restriction. (See the Appendix for some more details.)
We will use the atom Vi as a shorthand for Vi = true, and
the negated atom ¬Vi as a shorthand for Vi = false. If Vi
is endogenous, we write φLi for φVi in both cases.
A causal model M is a tool to represent counterfactual re-
lations between variables, in the sense that changing the
values of the variables on the right-side of an equation can
change the value of the variable on the left-side, but not
vice versa. This makes them suitable devices to model in-
terventions on an actual setting, meaning changes to the
value of a variable Vi that affect only the values of vari-
ables that depend on Vi, but not those on whom Vi itself
depends.
Syntactically, we make use of the do()-operator introduced
by Pearl (2000) to represent such an intervention. For a
model M and an endogenous variable Vi, we denote by
Mdo(Vi) and Mdo(¬Vi) the models that are identical to M
except that the equations for Vi are Vi := true and Vi :=
false, respectively. Hence for a causal setting (M,~u) such
that (M,~u) |= C, the causal setting (Mdo(¬C), ~u) corre-
sponds to the counterfactual setting resulting from the in-
tervention on (M,~u) that prevents C.
Throughout this paper, we take C and E to be endogenous
literals, where C is a candidate cause for the effect E.
3 Literature Survey
In this paper we consider the following approaches to defin-
ing causation: (Lewis, 1973; Hitchcock, 2001; Woodward,
2003; Hall, 2004, 2007; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern,
2016; Weslake, 2015). All of them take as their starting
point the assumption that counterfactual dependence is suf-
ficient for causation. Informally, given that E and C in fact
did occur, E is said to be (counterfactually) dependent on
C if E would not have occurred without C. The coun-
terfactual is here interpreted in the usual non-backtracking
sense, meaning we assume the non-occurrence of C is the
result of an intervention do(¬C) on the actual story. For
matters of simplicity, most authors only consider determin-
istic examples, meaning the intervention do(¬C) results in
precisely one counterfactual story. We comply with this
custom for the most part of this paper, but in Section 4.1
we also consider non-deterministic dependence: E is pos-
sibly counterfactually dependent on C if possibly E would
not have occurred without C. We here present a formal
definition of dependence in the deterministic case.
Definition 1. Given a causal setting (M,~u) such that
(M,~u) |= C ∧ E, E is counterfactually dependent on C
if (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= ¬E.
We take the sufficiency of dependence as our first principle.
Principle 1 (Dependence). If E is dependent on C in a
causal setting (M,~u), then C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u).
There are three basic types of examples which are com-
monly used to defend the claim that dependence is not nec-
essary, namely Early Preemption, Late Preemption, and
Symmetric Overdetermination. Of course there exist many
more counterexamples to the necessity of dependence, but
in essence they can all be reduced to these paradigmatic
cases, or combinations thereof. To illustrate, we present a
case of Early Preemption from Hitchcock (2001)[p. 276]:
Example 1 (Backup). An assassin-in-traininig is on his
first mission. Trainee is an excellent shot: if he shoots his
gun, the bullet will fell Victim. Supervisor is also present,
in case Trainee has a last minute loss of nerve (a common
affliction among student assassins) and fails to pull the trig-
ger. If Trainee does not shoot, Supervisor will shoot Victim
herself. In fact, Trainee performs admirably, firing his gun
and killing Victim.
The following is the standard model used in the literature
for this story, where the context is such that Trainee is
true.
V ictim := Trainee ∨ Supervisor.
Supervisor := ¬Trainee.
Intuitively it is clear that Trainee is a cause of V ictim,
yet using this model we see that V ictim is not dependent
on Trainee. The starting point for any definition of cau-
sation in the counterfactual tradition is to provide a way of
handling cases of Early Preemption. Lewis (1973) does so
by invoking another appealing principle of causation: that
it is a transitive relation.
Principle 2 (Transitivity). If C is a cause of D and D
is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u), then C is a cause of E
w.r.t. (M,~u).
Lewis (1973) takes Dependence and Transitivity at face
value, and defines causation as the transitive closure of de-
pendence. This definition is able to handle cases of Early
Preemption by focussing on an intermediate event in be-
tween Trainee’s shot and Victim getting hit, for example
the event of Trainee’s bullet flying through the air. By
adding a variable to the model representing this event, say
Bullet, Lewis gets the desired result: V ictim is dependent
on Bullet, Bullet is dependent on Trainee, and thus by
Transitivity, Trainee causes V ictim.
Elegant as it may be, McDermott (1995) demonstrated that
there are two major problems with this definition: it is nei-
ther a necessary condition for causation, nor a sufficient
one. For the former: cases of Late Preemption and Sym-
metric Overdetermination do not contain a chain of de-
pendencies, and still intuitively exhibit causation. For the
latter: there are intuitively convincing counterexamples to
the transitivity of causation. The first problem is gener-
ally taken to be a decisive blow to Lewis’ definition. The
second problem, however, has more general repercussions:
giving up Transitivity is not taken lightly. To understand
why this is the case, we give an overview of the literature
on this problem.
3.1 Counterexamples to Transitivity
Many authors have tackled the issue of transitivity, and
their analysis always contains the following two proper-
ties: the transitivity of causation sounds intuitively ap-
pealing, but unfortunately there are convincing counterex-
amples (McDermott, 1995; Hall, 2000, 2004; Hitchcock,
2001; Sartorio, 2005; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern,
2015; Paul and Hall, 2013). Halpern (2015) is the most re-
cent to take up this view, summarising the importance of
transitivity in the counterfactual tradition as follows [p. 2]:
Paul and Hall (2013)[p. 215] suggest that “pre-
serving transitivity is a basic desideratum for an
adequate analysis of causation”. Hall (2000) is
even more insistent, saying “That causation is,
necessarily, a transitive relation on events seems
to many a bedrock datum, one of the few indis-
putable a priori insights we have into the work-
ings of the concept.” Lewis (1986, 2000) im-
poses transitivity in his influential definition of
causality, by taking causality to be the transitive
closure (“ancestral”, in his terminology) of a one-
step causal dependence relation.
Although Halpern (2015) agrees that transitivity should be
preserved as much as possible, he acknowledges that there
are convincing counterexamples, as do all of the other au-
thors mentioned. To illustrate, we present a few of them
here.
The first is by Hitchcock (2001), but Hall (2000) gives an
almost identical example.
Example 2 (Boulder). A boulder is dislodged, and begins
rolling ominously toward Hiker. Before it reaches him,
Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder sails harm-
lessly over his head with nary a centimeter to spare. Hiker
survives his ordeal.
The following is an appropriate model for this story, where
the context is such that Boulder is true.
Dies := Boulder ∧ ¬Duck.
Duck := Boulder.
We see that Hiker surviving (¬Dies) is dependent on
Duck, and Duck in turn is dependent on Boulder. Hence
by Dependence, Boulder causes Duck and Duck causes
¬Dies. However it would be absurd to conclude from this
that the boulder coming down is a cause of hiker’s survival.
Thus this example presents a violation of Transitivity.
The next example is originally due to McDermott (1995)[p.
531], but is also discussed by others (Hall, 2000; Hitch-
cock, 2001; Halpern, 2015).
Example 3 (Dog Bite). Terrorist, who is right-handed,
must push a detonator button at noon to set off a bomb.
Shortly before noon, he is bitten by a dog on his right hand.
Unable to use his right hand, he pushes the detonator with
his left hand at noon. The bomb duly explodes.
We model this as follows, where the context is such that
DogBite is true.
Bomb := LH ∨RH.
LH := DogBite.
RH := ¬DogBite.
Just as with Boulder, it would be absurd to consider the dog
bite to be a cause of the explosion, as implied by Depen-
dence and Transitivity.
Next an example from Hall (2000) that is structurally iden-
tical to the previous one, and is also discussed by Halpern
and Pearl (2005).
Example 4 (Switch). An engineer is standing by a switch
in the railroad tracks. A train approaches in the distance.
She flips the switch, so that the train travels down the left-
hand track, instead of the right. Since the tracks reconverge
up ahead, the train arrives at its destination all the same.
The following is an appropriate model for this story, where
RT (LT ) means that the train goes down the right-hand
(left-hand) track, Dest means that the train arrives at its
destination, and the context is such that Switch holds, i.e.,
the engineer flips the switch.
Dest := LT ∨RT.
LT := Switch.
RT := ¬Switch.
Intuitively, flipping the switch is not a cause of the train’s
arrival, again going against the combined claims of Depen-
dence and Transitivity.
Many more counterexamples are given in the literature, but
their structures are very similar to the examples here pre-
sented. Given the existence of these intuitively convincing
counterexamples, all of the authors mentioned agree that
Transitivity should be abandoned.2
Although this means we are sacrificing an intuitive prop-
erty of causation, we should be careful not to sacrifice too
much: even if some cases provide convincing counterex-
amples to transitivity, there is no reason to abandon it al-
together. Again we take our cue from Halpern (2015)[p.
2]:
In light of the examples, should we just give up
on these intuitions? Paul and Hall (2013) sug-
gest that “What’s needed is a more developed
story, according to which the inference from “C
causes D” and “D causes E” to “C causes E” is
safe provided such-and-such conditions obtain –
where these conditions can typically be assumed
to obtain, except perhaps in odd cases.” The goal
of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions
for causality to be transitive.
Halpern (2015) only discusses such conditions in case of
dependence. By contrast, we provide several necessary and
sufficient conditions for dependence to be transitive, and
derive from this a sufficient condition for causation to be
transitive in general.
4 The (In)transitivity of Dependence
By Dependence we know already that whenever depen-
dence is transitive, causation will be transitive as well. In
all of the papers mentioned, it holds for all of the counterex-
amples there discussed, that they have one essential thing in
common: they are also counterexamples to the transitivity
of dependence.3 This leads to the suggestion that likewise,
whenever dependence violates transitivity, so does causa-
tion. Taken together this amounts to the following Condi-
tion:
2Originally Hall did try to hold on to Transitivity, by sacrific-
ing Dependence. Later, he rejected this view Hall (2000, 2007).
3This is in line with Hitchcock (2001)[p. 276], who defines
ordinary cases of causation as those where the transitivity of de-
pendence is respected.
Condition 1. If E depends on D and D depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u), then it holds that: C causes E w.r.t. (M,~u)
iff E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
Any definition which satisfies this condition has the desir-
able property that it violates transitivity in all of the coun-
terexamples discussed in the literature, while also respect-
ing transitivity in ordinary cases where dependence does so
as well.
Recall that dependence is not necessary for causation in
general, due to problem cases exhibiting Early Preemp-
tion, Late Preemption, or Symmetric Overdetermination.
The above condition states that in case we have a chain of
dependencies, dependence does become a necessary condi-
tion. To bring these two observations in agreement requires
showing that those problem cases do not occur in case there
is a chain of dependencies from C toD toE, but no depen-
dence of E on C.
Regarding Late Preemption and Symmetric Overdetermi-
nation, we shall be brief: there is no example in the lit-
erature we know of that is considered a case of either of
those, and for which Condition 1 is violated. Moreover,
Late Preemption differs from Symmetric Overdetermina-
tion only with regards to its temporal properties, which as
mentioned earlier is of no relevance to this paper. Therefore
we use the following classic example of Symmetric Overde-
termination to illustrate our point:
Example 5. [Symmetric Overdetermination] Suzy and
Billy both throw a rock at a bottle. Both rocks hit the bottle
simultaneously, upon which it shatters. Either rock by itself
would have sufficed to shatter the bottle.
We can model this story using the single equation BS :=
Suzy ∨ Billy, where BS represents the shattering of the
bottle, and Suzy (resp. Billy) represent Suzy (resp. Billy)
throwing a rock. The context is such that both Suzy and
Billy are true. Intuitively both Suzy and Billy are causes
of BS, yet BS is not dependent on either of them. It is
clear that in this example the failure of dependence has
nothing to do with issues of transitivity. Rather, the prob-
lem is that there are two completely independent processes
which suffice to bring about E, and both of them actually
occur, overdetermining E. Adding more detail by inserting
variables in between Suzy and BS, so that there is a chain
of causes leading from Suzy to BS, does nothing to change
the fact that there will never be a chain of dependencies
from Suzy to BS.
4.1 Early Preemption
Cases of Early Preemption provide the other reason why
dependence is not necessary for causation. Therefore we
need to show that such cases do not occur when there is a
chain of dependencies, and no dependence from the end of
the chain on its start, so that Condition 1 can be accepted.
There is one basic causal setting that is considered by most
to be the prototypical case of Early Preemption: it is the
setting used for Backup introduced in Section 3. The model
was the following, where the context is such that Trainee
holds:
V ictim := Trainee ∨ Supervisor.
Supervisor := ¬Trainee.
Since there is no chain of dependencies between Trainee
and V ictim, Condition 1 does not apply and there is no
problem with judging Trainee a cause of V ictim. We
will call this the small model.
Observe however that this model is quite similar to that
used for Dog Bite and Switch, two of the counterexamples
to the transitivity of causation we discussed earlier. The
only difference lies in there being an intermediate vari-
able in between the candidate cause and the effect. In
fact, as we mentioned in Section 3, the account of Lewis
exploits the similarity between these two models to deal
with Early Preemption: he creates a chain of dependencies
from Trainee to V ictim by adding an intermediate vari-
ableBullet that represents the bullet flying through midair.
Doing so results in what we will refer to as the large model:
V ictim := Bullet ∨ Supervisor.
Bullet := Trainee.
Supervisor := ¬Trainee.
This model is identical to the ones that we have used
for Dog Bite and Switch. Since Condition 1 was formu-
lated precisely to avoid the conclusion that DogBite and
Switch are causes, applying it to this model likewise leads
to the result that Trainee is not a cause of V ictim.
We are thus faced with the following problem: the large
model is suggested as a model both for examples labelled
Early Preemption, in which there is no causation, and for
examples labelled Switch, in which there is causation. (By
calling an example a Switch, we simply mean that it is an
example where intuitively there is no causation, as opposed
to Early Preemption.) Therefore the only way out is to
argue that the large model is not appropriate for either one
of these examples.
We present three strategies for arguing that the large model
is not appropriate for Early Preemption, and one strategy
which argues against it being appropriate for Switch. Two
of the first three strategies present an analysis of Early Pre-
emption that does not conflict with Condition 1. The two
remaining strategies do conflict with Condition 1, but we
will argue that they are problematic, and should therefore
be avoided.
First, we start with the strategy defended by Weslake
(2015), which is the simplest. According to him, the dis-
tinguishing feature of Early Preemption is that there is no
intermediate variable between the candidate cause and the
effect. Therefore only the small model is appropriate for
Early Preemption, and only the large model is appropriate
for Switch, case closed.
Second, we discuss our own preferred strategy to handle
this problem. We argue against using the large model for
Early Preemption, but the argument applies just as well to
the small model: we claim that an appropriate model for
Early Preemption ought to be non-deterministic. Hence
contrary to the first strategy, the presence of an interme-
diate variable between Trainee and V ictim is irrelevant
to our strategy.4
Specifically, we claim that the underlying motivation be-
hind calling Trainee a cause in the Backup example is
that contrary to the two models above, intuitively we do
consider it possible that Victim’s death is dependent on
Trainee’s action after all. For instance, it is natural to as-
sume that even Supervisors are not always accurate, or may
also have a loss of nerve. Adding these assumptions to the
small model gives the following, more appropriate, non-
deterministic model:
V ictim := Trainee ∨ (Supervisor ∧Accurate).
Supervisor := ¬Trainee ∧ ¬Nerves.
Here we have added variables to represent the accuracy of
Supervisor’s shot, and the possibility that he has a loss of
nerve. The actual story only gives us the partial context
such that Trainee holds, leaving unspecified the values of
Accurate and Nerves. Using this model results in there
being possible counterfactual stories so that Victim does
not die. This implies that possibly V ictim is dependent
on Trainee, and therefore possibly Trainee is a cause of
V ictim.
We can make this formally precise by extending the con-
text ~U with exogenous variables ~W (such as Accurate
and Nerves) whose values are undetermined in the actual
story.
Definition 2. Given a causal model M over endogenous
variables ~V and exogenous variables ~U , we define a partial
context as an assignment ~u′ of values to variables so that
~U ′ ⊆ ~U , and refer to (M, ~u′) as a partial causal setting. We
call an assignment ~w to the remaining exogenous variables
W = U \ U ′ a completion of u′.
Further, we will say that something is certain in a par-
tial causal setting (M, ~u′), if it holds in all causal settings
(M, ~u′ ∪ ~w) that complete u′. Likewise, something is pos-
sible if it holds in at least one causal setting (M, ~u′ ∪ ~w)
that completes u′.
4Menzies (2004) also argues that the intermediate variable
does not matter, and likewise claims that Trainee is not a cause
in either of the two deterministic models.
Since V ictim is dependent on Trainee in case either
¬Accurate or Nerves holds, by Dependence we get that
Trainee is possibly an actual cause of V ictim.
One might object that this conclusion is too weak, on the
grounds that our intuitive judgment is best understood as
the claim that Trainee is certainly an actual cause of
V ictim. If that is true, then we bite the bullet and ac-
cept the fact that our intuitive judgment is wrong. There
is however a more subtle way to understand our intuitive
causal judgments that allows them to fall short of certainty,
by distinguishing between different levels of information
about the actual story. If we have full information, then we
are dealing with a complete causal setting, and the notions
of certainty and possibility collapse into the actual. In the
absence of any information regarding the actual story, on
the other hand, we are left with just the causal model to de-
termine the possible actual causes. Therefore the notions
of “possible actual cause” and “actual cause” come closer
together as a partial context comes closer to a complete
context. The formal details that determine when these two
notions are close enough to be used interchangeably are
to be found in the Appendix, but the idea is, roughly, that
we only allow uncertainty regarding exogenous variables
whose influence is limited entirely to counterfactual sto-
ries. This condition is fulfilled in Early Preemption cases
like Backup because the values of Accurate and Nerves
only come into play when considering the counterfactual
that Trainee would not have shot.
Another possible objection to our strategy is that it amounts
to begging the question, since the elements of uncertainty
that we have introduced are not part of the original story.
Therefore, the objection goes, our solution no longer works
if we explicitly stipulate that Victim will die in all of the
possible counterfactual stories. Our answer is simple: we
agree that in such a case Trainee would indeed not be a
cause of V ictim.
We believe the problem here lies not with our causal judg-
ments, but with the discrepancy between stipulating that a
causal model is deterministic, and our intuition that it is
not. By stipulating that certain extremely counterintuitive
characteristics hold for a scenario that is greatly underde-
termined by its short description, we end up with an ex-
ample that is too far removed from common-sense for our
intuitions to offer any guidance. Concretely, in order to get
our intuitions on board with the assumption that the Backup
example is truly deterministic requires more than stating
that it is impossible for Supervisor to have a loss of nerves,
or to miss when he shoots. For starters, we need to imagine
a situation where the only possible options for Trainee are
to either shoot accurately at Victim, or not to shoot at all.
We are to imagine that he is unable to shoot and miss on
purpose, or that he shoots Supervisor instead of Victim, or
shouts to Victim to seek cover, etc. If we are to rely on our
intuitions here at all, we better come up with a more real-
istic scenario to describe Trainee’s predicament. In other
words, we need an example where Trainee is faced with a
binary choice such that regardless of the choice he makes
Victim will die as a result. We don’t have to look very far,
the following example fits those criteria:
Example 6 (Trainee’s Switch). Trainee is standing by a
switch in the railroad tracks. A train approaches in the
distance. She flips the switch, so that the train travels down
the left-hand track, instead of the right. Since the tracks
reconverge up ahead, the train arrives at its destination all
the same. Unfortunately for Victim, he is tied to the tracks
at the destination, and is killed by the train.
As was the case for Switch, here it is entirely plausible
to assume that the backup process will certainly function
properly, i.e., the right track will not break down all of
a sudden. Hence here we certainly have an example for
which our intuitions agree that Victim’s death is inevitable,
as opposed to the Backup example. As with Switch, intu-
itively Trainee flipping the switch is not a cause of Victim’s
death, which confirms our analysis.
Cases of Early Preemption are distinguished from Switches
on a one-by-one basis: is the scenario such that the relevant
counterfactual story, in which we have both ¬C and ¬E,
should be allowed by the model, i.e., is there any reason
to doubt that the backup process will function properly? If
yes, then possibly there is dependence and we consider it a
case of Early Preemption. If no, then the backup process
– Supervisor shooting, the functioning of the right hand
track, Terrorist using his right hand – is taken to be reliable
and it is a Switch. Obviously this distinction involves a
certain amount of subjectivity, but given the divergence of
intuitions between people regarding the same story we take
this to be a benefit of our approach.
Third we consider the strategy by Hall (2007), which is
similar to ours, but not quite the same. He also uses the
large model only for Switch, whereas his model for Early
Preemption contains an extra variable that serves to turn the
backup process on or off. As with our strategy, he agrees
that the distinction between the two cases comes down to
whether or not the backup process can fail. The difference
is that on his view of Early Preemption, even if we some-
how have evidence that in the actual story the backup pro-
cess was reliable and would not have failed, we may still
consider the counterfactual story in which it does fail. But
on this view it becomes quite hard – if not impossible –
to express the difference between Early Preemption and a
Switch. For every backup process there is some relevant
property on which its reliability depends: Supervisor being
accurate or not losing his nerves, Terrorist’s ability to use
his right hand, the right hand track not being broken, etc.
All it takes on his account to change a Switch into a case
of Early Preemption is to add a variable representing this
property. Then, even if we have evidence that the relevant
property is present, we may still consider the counterfac-
tual story in which it is not.5 Because of this undesirable
consequence, we do not find this strategy convincing.
Fourth there is the strategy offered by Hitchcock (2001) and
Halpern and Pearl (2005): they argue that both the small
and the large model are appropriate for Early Preemption,
but neither is appropriate to model switching stories such
as Dog Bite and Switch. They are forced to take up this po-
sition, because their solution to get Trainee to come out
as a cause in the small model applies just as well to the
large model. In response to the common practice of using
the large model for Switches, they argue case by case why
on closer inspection that model is not appropriate for a par-
ticular story, or why that story should be considered a case
of Early Preemption rather than a Switch. Let us examine
both replies.
Hitchcock (2001) argues against using the large model for
Dog Bite. However, that argument only applies to accounts
that make use of so-called “ENF counterfactuals”, which
are a particular form of interventions on a structural model
that we will not go into.6 Halpern and Hitchcock (2010)[p.
16] argue against using the large model for Switch, on the
basis that the variables LT and RT are logically related:
“the train cannot be on both tracks at once”. First of all, we
disagree that the relation between these variables is logi-
cal: it is matter of physics, not logic, that a train can only
occupy a single track at any given moment. Second of all,
this argument does not apply to Dog Bite, as one can push a
detonator using two hands. In light of this, and in absence
of a general argument as to why such models should never
be used to model switches, this reply is not convincing.
Regarding the same Switch example, Halpern and Pearl
(2005)[p. 27] claim that the large model can be appropri-
ate, but only if we consider the possibility that the right
hand track will fail as relevant.
It is this possibility [that of a malfunctioning
track] that should enter our mind whenever we
decide to designate each track as a separate
mechanism (i.e., equation) in the model and,
keeping this contingency in mind, it should not
be too odd to name the switch position a cause of
the train arrival (or non-arrival).
Pearl (2000) makes the same claim regarding a Switch
made up of two lamps. The motivation behind this strategy
and ours is the same: if we take the failure of the backup
process to be a relevant possibility, then we should con-
sider the counterfactual story in which it does. The dif-
ference is that we do not seek recourse in structural con-
tingencies (such as ENF counterfactuals) to represent such
5Hitchcock (2009)[p. 398] offers a similar criticism.
6See Paul and Hall (2013)[ch. 5] for a detailed discussion of
the problems these ENF counterfactuals pose to dealing properly
with the counterexamples to Transitivity.
counterfactual stories, but use a partial context to allow
for non-deterministic models. It is important to point out
that this agreement is limited to the distinction between
Switches and Early Preemption, and should not be gen-
eralised. Halpern and Pearl (2005) use structural contin-
gencies to consider vastly different counterfactual stories
as well, which have nothing to do with the issue at hand.
We have now discussed four of the most important strate-
gies to handling Early Preemption, and presented a number
of arguments against adopting the third or fourth strategy.
What matters for the subject of this paper, however, is that
the first and second strategies are both viable options for
handling Early Preemption properly without running into
conflict with Condition 1.
To sum up, because of the fact that the counterexamples to
Transitivity are without exception also counterexamples
to the transitivity of dependence, and in light of the lack
of opposition from problem cases like Overdetermination
and Early Preemption, we claim that Condition 1 should
be accepted.
5 Transitivity in General
5.1 Contributing
A proper understanding of the intransitivity of causation
requires looking further than dependence. Dependence
stands at one end of a spectrum, as a strong but intransi-
tive relation that is sufficient for causation. At the other
end there is the concept of contributing, which is a weak
and transitive relation. We introduce some new concepts in
order to define it, and present it as a necessary condition for
causation.
Definition 3. We define that a consistent set of literals ~L
is sufficient for a literal Li w.r.t. M if
∧ ~L ⇒ φLi and Li
is positive, or
∧ ~L ⇒ ¬φLi and Li is negative. Here, ∧ ~L
denotes the conjunction of all elements of ~L.
For example, in our rock-throwing model for Symmetric
Overdetermination, {Suzy} is sufficient for BS because
Suzy ⇒ Suzy ∨ Billy is a logically valid implication,
similarly {¬Suzy,¬Billy} is sufficient for ¬BS because
¬Suzy ∧ ¬Billy ⇒ ¬(Suzy ∨Billy) is trivially valid.
A sufficient set as a whole clearly contributes to a literal be-
ing true, but its necessary elements are doing all the work.
Definition 4. Given (M,~u) |= C ∧ E, we define that C is
a direct actual contributing cause of E if there exists a set
of literals ~L containing C, such that (M,~u) |= ~L and ~L is
sufficient for E, but ~L \ {C} is not. We call ~L a witness for
C w.r.t. E.
Note that only literals which appear in the equation for
E can ever be direct actual contributing causes. To illus-
trate, both Suzy and Billy are direct actual contributing
causes of BS in Symmetric Overdetermination, with wit-
nesses {Suzy} and {Billy} respectively. More generally,
the connection between two literals need not be direct:
Definition 5. Given (M,~u) |= C ∧ E, we define that C
is an actual contributing cause of E if there exist literals
C = L1, . . . , Ln = E so that each Li is a direct actual
contributing cause of Li+1.
From now on we speak simply of C contributing to E,
rather than saying that C is an actual contributing cause
of E. Informally, if C does not contribute to E, it plays
no role in determining the value of E. Indeed, we leave
it to the reader to verify that all the definitions under con-
sideration – mentioned in Section 3 – satisfy the following
principle:
Principle 3 (Contributing). IfC is a cause ofE in a causal
setting (M,~u), then C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Informally, what this principle states is that all ac-
tual causes of E are literals that contributed to satisfy-
ing/falsifying an equation, which in turn contributed to sat-
isfying/falsifying another equation, etc., which in the end
contributed to satisfying/falsifying the equation for E.
The following is an interesting connection between depen-
dence and contributing, that will prove useful for interpret-
ing subsequent results.
Theorem 1. E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u) iff C con-
tributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C contributes to ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Proofs of all Theorems can be found in the Appendix.
5.2 A Sufficient Condition for Transitivity
Condition 1 states that causation and dependence are
equally transitive in case we have a chain of dependencies.
The next step is to look at transitivity in case there is a
chain of causes simpliciter, but not necessarily a chain of
dependencies. More specifically, we want to find a good
sufficient condition for the transitivity of causation in gen-
eral. Since Condition 1 suffices to respect all counterexam-
ples to Transitivity from the literature, a naive suggestion
would be to simply demand that causation is always transi-
tive when there is no chain of dependencies. To understand
why this would not work, we show how the counterexam-
ples can easily be modified so that there no longer is a chain
of dependencies, yet intuition would still find that causation
is intransitive. All we need to do is add a little Symmetric
Overdetermination into the mix.
Example 7 (Dog Bite with Backup). Imagine the story of
the Terrorist from Dog Bite, but with a little twist: there
are two detonators that can be pushed, either of which will
set off the bomb. To make sure nothing goes wrong, Backup
pushes the other detonator at the same moment as Terrorist
does.
We can re-use our old model, except that we add Backup’s
action.
Bomb := LH ∨RH ∨Backup
LH := DogBite.
RH := ¬DogBite.
Just as in the original example, Dependence implies that
DogBite is a cause of LH . However, Bomb is now no
longer dependent on LH , so there is no chain of depen-
dencies from DogBite to Bomb and Condition 1 does not
apply. Because Bomb is symmetrically overdetermined by
both LH and Backup, we also have that LH should still
be a cause of Bomb. Nevertheless DogBite should still
not be considered a cause of Bomb.
The lesson learned is that the focus should not be on the
presence of a chain of dependencies as such, but rather
on the conditions that decide whether or not dependence is
transitive. Therefore we now present three different char-
acterisations of the transitivity of dependence.
Theorem 2. If E depends on D and D depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u), then the following statements are all equiv-
alent:
1. E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
2. ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
3. ¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
4. ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Note that in general, i.e., without the restriction to chains
of dependencies, the statements in this theorem are not all
equivalent. Rather we have that 1 ⇔ 2, and 2 ⇒ 3 ⇒ 4,
but also 4 6⇒ 3 6⇒ 2.
This theorem shows that to satisfy Condition 1, it suffices
to take any of the three last conditions as a sufficient con-
dition for the transitivity of causation. Since Transitivity
is intuitively appealing, we want to restrict Transitivity as
little as possible. Given that the last condition from The-
orem 2 is clearly weaker than the other three (in general),
this naturally leads to the following condition:
Condition 2. [Sufficient Condition for Transitivity] If C
causes D and D causes E w.r.t. (M,~u), then the following
holds:
If ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u) then C
causes E w.r.t. (M,~u).
In light of Theorem 2 and Dependence, we can interpret
Condition 2 informally as stating that a definition of causa-
tion ought to be “at least as transitive as dependence”, i.e.,
its sufficiency condition for transitivity should be at least as
weak as that for dependence. (Note that this statement can
be endorsed without having to accept Condition 1.) Before
we follow through on this lead, we present an example to
show that violations of Condition 2 lead to counterintuitive
results.
5.3 Counterexample
To illustrate what goes wrong if Condition 2 is not ac-
cepted, we look at two very similar examples using the def-
initions from Halpern and Pearl (2005), Woodward (2003),
and Weslake (2015), none of which satisfies Condition 2.
Example 8 (Assassin). Assassin adds Cyanide to Victim’s
coffee, which is certain to kill a person. Backup adds a
Liquid to the coffee that reacts with Coffee to form Arsenic,
another lethal substance. Victim drinks his coffee, which
now contains lethal doses of both Cyanide and Arsenic, and
dies.
We can model this as follows, where the context is such
that Liquid and Cyanide are true:
Dies := Arsenic ∨ Cyanide.
Arsenic := Liquid ∧ Coffee.
All of the definitions listed in Section 3 – including the
three mentioned above – agree that Liquid is a cause of
Dies.7
By Dependence, Liquid is a cause ofArsenic. Further, as
was the case with Symmetric Overdetermination, Arsenic
is a cause of Dies. Given that ¬Liquid cannot possibly
contribute to Dies, Condition 2 implies that Liquid is a
cause of Dies, in agreement with the above definitions.
However, if we change the example only slightly, we get
a different result. Imagine that instead of the Liquid react-
ing with Coffee to form Arsenic, it’s the reaction between
Liquid and Cyanide that forms Arsenic. In other words, we
assume the following model:
Dies := Arsenic ∨ Cyanide.
Arsenic := Liquid ∧ Cyanide.
For this example the three definitions mentioned do violate
Condition 2, because they no longer judge Liquid to be a
cause of Dies. It is hard to see what could possibly jus-
tify this change in causal judgment: in both cases Liquid
is added to a coffee containing Cyanide, in both cases Liq-
uid reacts with part of that mixture, and in both cases this
results in two lethal substances overdetermining Victim’s
death. Therefore the intuitive result would be that Liquid
remains a cause in this example as well, which is guaran-
teed by accepting Condition 2.
7Strictly speaking the latest definition defended by Halpern
(2016) is an exception, since it judges Liquid to be part of cause
rather than a cause proper. However, he also suggests that these
terms ought to be used synonymously.
6 Transitivity and Asymmetry
6.1 Asymmetry
Looking back at the model which we identified as a Switch,
i.e., the second model we considered in Section 4.1, we
note that there is a remarkable symmetry between the ac-
tual story and the counterfactual story that we get when
intervening on C: in both cases there is a chain of counter-
factual dependence from the candidate cause (C and ¬C,
respectively) to the effect E.
This offers an appealing explanation for why C should not
be considered a cause of E in this case: causes are differ-
ence makers, i.e., the value of C should make a difference
as to whether or not it causes E. In case of dependence, C
trivially makes such a difference, as in that case C deter-
mines whether or not E occurs at all. Cases of overdeter-
mination and the like show that making a difference can be
more subtle. These observations motivated Sartorio (2005)
to propose the following principle:8
Principle 4 (Asymmetry). If C is a cause of
E w.r.t. (M,~u), then ¬C is not a cause of E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
As Asymmetry and Transitivity focus on entirely differ-
ent properties of causation, it is no surprise that they con-
flict with each other:
Theorem 3. Dependence, Transitivity, and Asymmetry
are mutually inconsistent.
Theorem 3 teaches us that accepting Asymmetry provides
an explanation for the fact that there are violations of Tran-
sitivity.9 In fact, picking up our earlier discussion, Asym-
metry together with Contributing helps to make sense of
Condition 2, which we can rephrase informally as:
IfC causesD andD causesE w.r.t. (M,~u), then
the following holds:
Transitivity should be respected unless this
would violate Asymmetry.
There are now enough elements on the table to construct a
coherent genesis of causation that explains its limited tran-
sitivity.
6.2 Putting it all Together
We started our analysis by noting the strong connection
between dependence and causation. Specifically, by De-
pendence and Contributing, we know that causation lies
8Weslake (2015) adopts a similar – but not identical – princi-
ple.
9Sartorio (2005) also uses Switches to argue that violations of
Transitivity are due to Asymmetry.
somewhere in between dependence and contributing. Fur-
ther, in the overwhelming majority of cases, all three of
these concepts behave as a transitive relation. So as a first
approximation, we assume causation to be some relation,
say Trans(X,Y ), which satisfies the following condition:
Condition 3. 1. Trans(X,Y ) is transitive.
2. If Trans(C,E) then C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
3. If E depends on C then Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u).
The following generalisation of Theorem 1 offers a useful
connection between dependence and such a Trans(X,Y )
relation.
Theorem 4. If Trans(X,Y ) satisfies Condition 3, then:
E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u) iff Trans(C,E)
w.r.t. (M,~u) and Trans(¬C,¬E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
The following is a direct consequence of this theorem,
which in analogy with Asymmetry we may call Anti-
Symmetry.
Corollary 1 (Anti-Symmetry). If E depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u), then ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Informally, this result tells us that dependence is built up
out of any relation Trans(X,Y ) that satisfies Condition
3, in conjunction with the constraint that it should be Anti-
Symmetrical.
Since for causation we only require Asymmetry, the solu-
tion is straightforward: causation is built up out of some
relation Trans(X,Y ) that satisfies Condition 3, in con-
junction with Asymmetry. Putting all of this together, we
get the following tentative characterisation of a good defi-
nition of causation:
Condition 4. There exists a relation Trans(X,Y ) such
that each of the following holds:
1. Trans(X,Y ) is transitive.
2. C causes E w.r.t. (M,~u) iff Trans(C,E)
w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬Trans(¬C,E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
3. If Trans(C,E) then C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
4. If E depends on C then Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u).
Any definition of causation satisfying the first and second
part of Condition 4 is a compromise between Transitivity
and Asymmetry: Transitivity is sacrificed only to the ex-
tent that is required to satisfy Asymmetry. Add to this the
other two constraints, and we get a definition that has all
the properties we have argued for.
Theorem 5. Any definition of causation satisfying Condi-
tion 4 satisfies Dependence, Asymmetry, and Contribut-
ing, and Conditions 1 and 2.
Since the weakest possible choice for Trans is to take con-
tributing to, we state here the most straightforward defini-
tion of causation which meets all the demands of Condition
4.
Definition 6. Given (M,~u) |= C ∧ E, we define C to
be an actual cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u) if C contributes
to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C does not contribute to E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
This definition gives the desired result for all of the exam-
ples discussed. We leave the details to the reader. (See the
Appendix for details regarding Early Preemption.) How-
ever we consider Definition 6 too simple in order to be an
adequate definition of causation in general. In this paper
we focussed solely on issues arising from Transitivity and
Asymmetry, but we have completely ignored issues related
to the temporal properties of causation. More specifically,
said definition is unable to deal with examples exhibiting
Late Preemption, where an effect is overdetermined by two
(or more) processes but only one of them deserves to be
called a cause. In order to deal with those cases as well, and
thus arrive at a definition of causation that is suited in gen-
eral, the Trans relation should take into account temporal
information as well. We intend to do so in future work, by
developing the transitive notion of Production as a form of
contributing that excludes preempted events. Specifically,
we aim to generalise the notion of production as introduced
by Hall (2004), who uses it to highlight features of causa-
tion that are not found in dependence.
7 Conclusion
Starting from the observation that despite the intuitive ap-
peal of the transitivity of causation there are many convinc-
ing counterexamples to accepting it, we have constructed
an analysis in order to explain the precise relation between
causation and transitivity. By pointing out the connection
between violations of the transitivity of dependence, and
violations of transitivity in general, we arrived at a charac-
terisation of the transitivity of dependence that suggested a
suitable sufficient condition for the transitivity of causation.
Adding to this the principle of asymmetry resulted in a de-
tailed genesis of causation, that narrows down the search
to a proper definition of causation considerably. Finally,
we have suggested a definition which meets all the require-
ments discussed, but remains incomplete until it is com-
plemented with temporal properties that can handle Late
Preemption.
8 Appendix
8.1 Generalising to Multi-valued Variables
As mentioned in Section 2, throughout this work we have
limited our discussion to models that only include Boolean
variables. We now explain how we can generalise our re-
sults to also include structural models that contain multi-
valued variables.
We defined a structural equation as taking on the form
Vi := φ, where φ is a propositional formula over ~V ∪ ~U ,
and we used Vi, resp. ¬Vi, as a shorthand for Vi = true,
resp. Vi = false. In this more general setting, a struc-
tural equation takes the form Vi := FVi( ~W ), where FVi
is a function from a set of variables ~W ⊆ (~V ∪ ~U) to the
domain of Vi. (The domains of each variable may vary, but
they are all assumed finite.) As before, we only consider
models M such that the equations are acyclic.
Since the values of variables are no longer limited to true
and false, the literals C and E that were used througout
have to be written out explicitly as C = c and E = e.
Further, a negated atom like ¬C, i.e., ¬(C = c), should
be replaced with a formula C = c′, and the condition that
c′ 6= c.
For example, counterfactual dependence is now defined as:
Definition 7. Given a causal setting (M,~u) such that
(M,~u) |= C = c ∧ E = e, E = e is counterfactually
dependent on C = c if ∃c′ 6= c, e′ 6= e : (Mdo(C=c′), ~u) |=
E = e′.
Except for explicitly writing out the literals, Condition 1
remains unchanged.
The generalisation of the definition of sufficiency is
straightforward:
Definition 8. We define that a consistent set of literals ~L =
~l is sufficient for a literal Li = li w.r.t. M if ~L = ~l ⇒
FLi(
~Wi) = li.
From there onwards, all definitions and theorems can be
generalised in the same manner. Proofs of all theorems re-
main the same. Asymmetry, for example, now becomes:
Principle 4 (Asymmetry). If C = c is a cause of E = e
w.r.t. (M,~u), then there exists a value c′ 6= c so that C = c′
is not a cause of E = e′ w.r.t. (Mdo(C=c′), ~u).
Finally, the generalised version of our definition of actual
causation becomes:
Definition 9. Given (M,~u) |= C = c ∧ E = e, we define
C = c to be an actual cause of E = e w.r.t. (M,~u) if
C = c contributes to E = e w.r.t. (M,~u) and there exists a
value c′ 6= c so that C = c′ does not contribute to E = e
w.r.t. (Mdo(C=c′), ~u).
8.2 Actual Causation in Non-deterministic Models
As we mentioned in Section 4.1 when discussing Early
Preemption, we accept a limited form of uncertainty re-
garding the actual story in judgments of actual causation.
We now make this formally precise, by specifying the level
of information that is required for the notions of “actual
cause” and “possible actual cause” to be used interchange-
ably.
Definition 10. We define that a partial causal setting
(M, ~u′) is actually complete if for any choice of C and E,
one of the two following conditions holds:
• C certainly contributes to E w.r.t. (M, ~u′).
• C certainly does not contribute to E w.r.t. (M, ~u′).
Given our definition of causation (Definition 6), an actu-
ally complete setting is one where all that is missing to
be certain of the actual causes is information regarding the
contributors in the counterfactual stories. This is precisely
the situation that we encounter in our non-deterministic
model for Backup from Section 4.1: the context tells us that
Trainee certainly contributes to V ictim, but in the coun-
terfactual story all we can say is that Supervisor possibly
contributes to V ictim.
This gives rise to the following generalisation of actual cau-
sation to actually complete settings:
Definition 11. Given an actually complete causal setting
(M, ~u′) such that certainly (M, ~u′) |= C ∧ E, we define
C to be an actual cause of E w.r.t. (M, ~u′) if C certainly
contributes to E w.r.t. (M, ~u′) and ¬C possibly does not
contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u′).
Applying this definition to the non-deterministic model for
Backup gives the desired result that Trainee is an actual
cause of V ictim.
The most general version of our definition of actual causa-
tion is given by the straightforward combination of Defini-
tions 9 and 11:
Definition 12 (Actual Causation). Given an actually com-
plete causal setting (M, ~u′) such that certainly (M, ~u′) |=
C = c ∧ E = e, we define C = c to be an actual cause
of E = e w.r.t. (M, ~u′) if C = c certainly contributes
to E = e w.r.t. (M, ~u′) and there exist a value c′ 6= c
so that C = c′ possibly does not contribute to E = e
w.r.t. (Mdo(C=c′), ~u′).
It is clear that if the actually complete causal setting is non-
partial (i.e., the context stipulates the value of each exoge-
nous variable) and all variables are Boolean, then Defini-
tion 12 reduces to Definition 6.
8.3 Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 1. E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u) iff C con-
tributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C contributes to ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Proof. The implication from right to left is trivial, so we
only prove the implication from left to right. So assume E
depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), or in other words, (M,~u) |=
C ∧ E and (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= ¬E.
We first prove that C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Take L1 to be minimally sufficient for E, i.e., L1 is suffi-
cient forE, and for any Li ∈ L1, L1 \{Li} is not sufficient
forE. (Such a set can be constructed by removing elements
from a sufficient set ~L one by one.) By construction, all en-
dogenous literals in L1 are direct actual contributors to E.
By L(M,~u) we denote all literals Li such that (M,~u) |= Li.
Since ~U = ~u ⊂ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), it follows that if L1 \
~U = ~u ⊆ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), then E ∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), i.e.,
(Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= E. Therefore there exists at least one en-
dogenous literal D ∈ L1 such that D 6∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u). By
the previous paragraph, D is a direct actual contributor to
E.
If D = C, then we are finished with this part of the proof.
So assume D 6= C. We can apply the exact same rea-
soning as we did for E, to find a direct actual contributor
F to D such that F 6∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u). Since contributing
is transitive, F contributes to E as well. Given that there
are only a finite number of endogenous literals, and that M
is assumed to be acyclical, continuing this reasoning will
eventually end up with finding C as an actual contributing
cause of E. Therefore we conclude that C contributes to E
w.r.t. (M,~u).
We can apply the exact same reasoning to prove that also
¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u), which con-
cludes the proof.
Theorem 2. If E depends on D and D depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u), then the following statements are all equiv-
alent:
1. E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
2. ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
3. ¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
4. ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Proof. Assume E depends on D and D depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u). First, note that by Theorem 1 this implies that
C contributes to D and D contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Since contributing is transitive by construction, this implies
that C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
We start with assuming that E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
It follows directly from the definitions that this is equivalent
to ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Now assume we know that ¬E depends on ¬C
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). Given that we already know that
C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u), by Theorem 1 we
see that this is equivalent to ¬C contributes to ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Lastly, assume that ¬C contributes to ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). It follows directly that ¬C does
not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). Remains the
reverse implication. It suffices to show that if ¬C
does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u), then
(Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= ¬E.
We proceed by a reductio: assume that ¬C does not con-
tribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u) and (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= E.
D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), and thus (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |=
¬D. Together with the fact that (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= E,
this implies that (Mdo(¬C,¬D), ~u) |= E. Also, since E
depends on D w.r.t. (M,~u), we have (Mdo(¬D), ~u) |=
¬E. Therefore ¬E depends on C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬D), ~u).
By Theorem 1, this implies that ¬C contributes to E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C,¬D), ~u), and thus also ¬C contributes to E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u), which concludes the proof.
Theorem 3. Dependence, Transitivity, and Asymmetry
are mutually inconsistent.
Proof. We have a look again at the Switch example. In the
story such that Switch holds, by Dependence Switch is a
cause of LT and LT is a cause of Dest. By Transitivity,
this makes Switch a cause of Dest. But if we look at the
story do(¬Switch), then we can apply the same reasoning
to get that ¬Switch is a cause of Dest. This is in violation
of Asymmetry.
Theorem 4. If Trans(X,Y ) satisfies Condition 3, then:
E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u) iff Trans(C,E)
w.r.t. (M,~u) and Trans(¬C,¬E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Proof. We start with the implication from left to right. So
assume E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), which is equivalent
to ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). Hence by ap-
plying 3 to both statements, we get the desired result.
Remains the implication from right to left. So as-
sume Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u) and Trans(¬C,¬E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). By 2, this implies that C con-
tributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C contributes to ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). Applying Theorem 1 gives the re-
sult.
Theorem 5. Any definition of causation satisfying Condi-
tion 4 satisfies Dependence, Asymmetry, and Contribut-
ing, and Conditions 1 and 2.
Proof. Dependence: Assume E depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u). By 2, we need to show that Trans(C,E)
w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
The former is a direct consequence of 4, so remains the
latter.
Since E does not hold in (Mdo(¬C), ~u), we get that ¬C
does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). By 3, this
implies that ¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
Asymmetry and Contributing follow immediately from 2
and 3.
Condition 1: Assume E depends on D and D de-
pends on C w.r.t. (M,~u). By 1 and 4 this implies
that Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u). The implication from
right to left in the equivalence from Condition 1 fol-
lows from Dependence. So we need to prove that
¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u) implies that E de-
pends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
We proceed by a reductio: assume that ¬Trans(¬C,E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u) and (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= E.
D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), and thus (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |=
¬D. Together with the fact that (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= E, this
implies that (Mdo(¬C,¬D), ~u) |= E. Also, since E depends
on D w.r.t. (M,~u), we have (Mdo(¬D), ~u) |= ¬E. There-
fore ¬E depends on C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬D), ~u). By Theorem
4, this implies that Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C,¬D), ~u),
and thus also Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u), which
concludes the proof.
Condition 2: Assume C causes D and D causes
E w.r.t. (M,~u), and ¬C does not contribute to E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u). By 1, we get that Trans(C,E)
w.r.t. (M,~u). By 3, we also get that ¬Trans(¬C,E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u), and thus C causesE w.r.t. (M,~u).
References
Hall N (2000) Causation and the price of transitivity. Jour-
nal of Philosophy 97(4):198–222
Hall N (2004) Two concepts of causation. In: Collins J,
Hall N, Paul LA (eds) Causation and Counterfactuals,
The MIT Press, pp 225–276
Hall N (2007) Structural equations and causation. Philo-
sophical Studies 132(1):109–136
Halpern J (2015) Sufficient conditions for causality to be
transitive. Philosophy of Science
Halpern J (2016) Actual Causality. MIT Press
Halpern J, Hitchcock C (2010) Actual causation and the art
of modeling. In: Causality, Probability, and Heuristics:
A Tribute to Judea Pearl, London: College Publications,
pp 383–406
Halpern J, Pearl J (2005) Causes and explanations: A
structural-model approach. part I: Causes. The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(4):843–87
Hitchcock C (2001) The intransitivity of causation revealed
in equations and graphs. Journal of Philosophy 98:273–
299
Hitchcock C (2009) Structural equations and causation: six
counterexamples. Philosophical Studies 144:391–401
Lewis D (1973) Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70:113–
126
Lewis D (1986) Causation. In: Philosophical Papers II, Ox-
ford University Press, pp 159–213
Lewis D (2000) Causation as influence. Journal of Philos-
ophy 97(4):182–197
McDermott M (1995) Redundant causation. The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46(4):523–544
Menzies P (2004) Causal models, token causation, and pro-
cesses. Philosophy of Science 71(5):820–832
Paul L, Hall N (2013) Causation: a user’s guide. Oxford
University Press
Pearl J (2000) Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Infer-
ence. Cambridge University Press
Sartorio C (2005) Causes as difference-makers. Philosoph-
ical Studies 123:71–96
Weslake B (2015) A partial theory of actual causation. The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science forthcom-
ing
Woodward J (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of
Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press
